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Last week
Paralysed Enterprises Jeopardise
Economic Development. The
macroeconomics seminar held in the
International Centre for Policy Studies on
26 January saw the discussion of the
problem of existence of many nonviable
loss-making enterprises in Ukraine which
have a destructive effect on the national
economy and the state finances.
Cluster Model Finds Followers in Ukraine.
On Wednesday, 27 January, the International
Centre for Policy Studies hosted a round table
on the perspectives of the development of
small and medium enterprises in Ukraine. The
participants were given an insight into a
cluster model of business organisation.
Under the model, territorially adjacent
enterprises of the same industry unity to
enhance the efficiency of the use of
resources. This organisational model
eliminates competition amongst members of
one cluster and enables its members to fully
concentrate on manufacturing produce in
which it is most competitive. The cluster
model successfully serves the tasks of
entering overseas markets and enhancing
the cluster members competitiveness. The
model was presented by the head of a non-
profit organisation Podillya Pershyi
Mr Wolfgang Price. Podillya Pershyi is a
programme for the revival of industrial
production in Podillya region.
This Week
Methodology of Preparing Economic
Reports of the Government. On Tuesday,
2 February, the macroeconomics seminar
at the International Centre for Policy
Studies will be devoted to the issue of
methodological support of the
preparation of the governments reports
on economic situation. A speech will be
presented by the Head of the Economic
Analysis Division of the Ministry of
Economy of Ukraine Mr Evgen Frolov.
The Final Stage of the Contest Economic
Reforms in Ukraine: Viewpoint of the
Youth. The contest Economic Reforms in
Ukraine: Viewpoint of the Youth will come
to its final stage on February 35 to take
place at the International Centre of Policy
Studies and the National Bank of Ukraine.
The contestants will defend their projects on
the subject Development of Economic
Reforms in Ukraine at the Centre on
February 3-4. The awarding ceremony will
take place at the National Bank of Ukraine
on 5 February.
Paralysed Enterprises
The present governments economic policy supports nonviable, non-competitive
enterprises. The governments activities including subsidising, settlement of debts of
enterprises and defence of debtors from the creditors actions lead to unbalanced state
finances and build-up of indebtedness. This policy means preservation of the socialist
system of redistribution of profits earned by efficient enterprises for the benefit of
loss-making ones thus making economic growth impossible. This system may be
demolished only by stopping subsides, enforcing effective bankruptcy procedure and
strict budgetary discipline.
This is the conclusion reached by the participants of the seminar devoted to the
subject-matter of the first issue of the Policy Studies edition  Paralysed Enterprises.
Enterprises debts
were transferred to the budget
The ICPS economist Mrs Inna Lunina who had
researched the threat posed to the state
budget by the existence of nonviable
enterprises stated that budget revenues did not
cover current expenses on wages and transfer
payments. For eleven months of 1998, budget
revenues in Ukraine fell down to 26.7% of GDP,
compared to 30.4% of GDP in 1997. One of the
reasons for lower inflows to the budget was
that enterprises continued to increase their
debt in taxes and mandatory payments.
As at 1 October 1998, the outstanding
payments to the budget, extra-budgetary funds
and social insurance arrears reached UAH17
billion as reported by the State Statistics
Committee. Non-payments were widely used in
the Ukrainian economy, but outstanding debts
to the budget grew faster than overall
outstanding mutual arrears between
enterprises. Consequently, mutual arrears
between enterprises, first of all for energy
sources, were concentrated in debts to the
budget.
All the attempts by the government to reduce
the enterprises debts to the budget (by means
of write-offs and negotiation of debts, granting
loans, carrying out mutual settlements and
other specially designed measures) failed.
Mrs Lunina said that the main reason for
existence and accumulation of indebtedness of
the enterprises of all the sectors of the
Ukrainian economy was the state support
rendered to state and formerly state enterprises
which enabled them to ignore the new market
environment and encouraged non-payments
and barter. This system produced many
intermediators which used complicated
schemes to revert real money flows to
themselves and reload debts onto the state
budget.
Ukrainian economy ignores budget
constraints
Since transformation processes were initiated,
numerous enterprises that changed their form
of ownership had to transform their structure
and reconsider investment policies which could
allow for adjusting quickly to new demand and
sales conditions. The main idea of
restructuring was to create competitive
industries and change the behaviour of
enterprises by means of introducing strict
budget constraints typical to market economy.
But in fact, most
enterprises were not
restructured (in the sense
of transfer from soft to
strict budget
constraints). Though the
state policy was to
support and implement
market reforms, some
enterprises still could
influence price levels and
terms of taxation, as well
as relied upon state
subsidies.
The state actually
protected inefficient
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Debts to the state budget
Undue debts payable of Ukrainian enterprises
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enterprises from strict budget constraints by
means of subsidies, various money surrogates
and permissions not to repay their obligations.
This policy caused more and more potentially
profitable enterprises and industries to enter the
system of non-payments and debts to the
budget, limited resources to be used less
effective, and monopolisation and social
stratification to grow. This support of loss-
making enterprises preserved, economic decline
in Ukraine would continue and large-scale crisis
of the state finances would become inevitable.
Non-payments were caused
by slow reforms
The ICPS economist Mr Seryi Ilchuk analysed the
reasons for accumulation of mutual arrears
between Ukrainian enterprises and methods of
dealing with this problem. The analyst stated
that the main precondition of inter-payment
arrears between Ukrainian enterprises was the
external shock resulting from the collapse of
economic systems of the former Soviet Union
and the COMECON, as well as an internal shock
caused by the transition from the administrative
to the market economy. Ukrainian enterprises
were severely hurt when, after the price
liberalisation, energy became expensive and
demand re-oriented from industrial products
(extensively produced in the former Soviet
Union) to consumer goods. At the beginning of
transformation, actual overproduction and the
inability to go by market mechanisms resulted in
omnivorous shipments of goods to various
customers, including those who were not able to
pay for them.
At the same time, these debts gradually
transformed into strategic arrears. Enterprises
continued to ship their products, leaving aside
the question of payment. Moreover, they often
postponed paying bills consciously, hoping that
the government would be able to credit them
and solve the problem of non-payments. In
reality, the government followed this pattern
and was giving firms evergreen credits, while the
actual problem remained unsolved ¾ moreover,
arrears began to grow even more rapidly.
These developments facilitated the process of
accumulating unpaid bills on goods and
services. Soon, their volume reached one of the
highest levels amongst other transition
economies. By the end of 1996, the total mutual
debt of goods, operations and services between
enterprises accounted for 54% of GDP, while by
the end of 1997 this
number increased up
to 71% of GDP. The
share of outstanding
debts in total debt
grew from 79% in
1996 to 77% in 1997.
The size of total debt
did not settle down in 1998, though it increased
less rapidly: the average monthly increase in the
stock of debts was 2.4%.
Few bad debts existed between
enterprises
Mr Ilchuk noted that outstanding debts were
normally divided into late payments, and bad
debts ¾ those that were problematic and would
not probably be redeemed if the enterprise
were not restructured. Ukrainian bookkeeping
system lacked this debt classification, which
made it difficult to calculate the share of bad
debts. The only way that allowed for defining
this indicator was to base the evaluation on
the analysis of the outstanding debt structure
by terms, which was executed by the State
Statistics Committee for the period from 1
January 1997 to 1 January 1998. The
probability was rather high that debts with one
year of maturity were accumulated by
enterprises that suffered from the hard
financial situation and could not be redeemed
in the medium term. Therefore, the
approximate volume of bad debts was the stock
of debts with one year of maturity. By 1
January 1998 the stock of bad debts amounted
to UAH10 billion, which was 15% of the total
debt. This number was the lower bound of bad
debt share in the total debt, as bad liabilities
were also a part of debts that have 3 months-1
year of maturity. Therefore, the share of bad
debts exceeded 15%.
Mr Ilchuk emphasised that in 1998,
outstanding debt increased more rapidly in the
share of debts with maturity up to 3 months
(UAH8.4 billion, or 70% of the increase in
outstanding debt). However, in this category
of liabilities, the increase in bad debts was
significantly smaller, as enterprises usually
redeemed them. As a result, the increase in the
stock of debt with 3 months1 year of maturity
was insignificant.
This fact proves that Ukrainian enterprises
learned how to differentiate between bad and
diligent
customers, and
moreover, they do
not work under
soft budget
constraints and
are not willing to
grant trade loans
to unverified
firms.
Government allowed for creating
debts
As soon as the government gave up direct
financing and unrestricted trade credit came to
a stall  directors of loss-making enterprises
started to utilise barter operations and
accumulate arrears. Nonviable enterprises were
able to continue their operations only through
postponing payments to the budget and to their
employees. And the government implicitly
allowed unprofitable strategically important
industries and large enterprises to build up
strategic debt.
Mr Ilchuk mentioned the following main reasons
for build-up of mutual arrears between
enterprises:
 unfavourable business environment which led
to the spread of trade loans;
 the state support of inefficient enterprises
which concentrated bad debts;
 absence of a straightforward mechanism of
property liability.
To stop the growth in debts the following
measures were suggested:
 passage of a real budget;
 tax cuts;
 implementation of effective bankruptcy
procedure;
 prohibition of mutual write-offs;
 swift privatisation.
Loss-making enterprises would not
go bankrupt
When commenting on the future of nonviable
enterprises after the introduction of strict
budget constraints the World Bank chief
economist Mr John Hansen said that one should
clearly distinguish between loss-making, value-
subtracting and potentially bankrupt
enterprises. Mr Hansen stated that under the
conditions of very unfavourable business
environment in Ukraine many enterprises were
loss-making on paper but did not subtract
value: big costs did not allow them to reach at
least the break-even points. Mr Hansen also
emphasised that that not every loss-making
enterprise would go bust. This would be the case
with economic agents which hid their revenues
from taxation. If a strict bankruptcy procedure
was implemented many of these enterprises
would prefer to repay their indebtedness
including tax debts rather than to go bankrupt .
Market Economy is Strict Budget Constraints
As described by Hungarian economist Yanus Kornai, strict budget
constraints have five distinctive features: (1) prices are formulated by
the market and enterprises cannot interfere in this process, (2) enterprises
cannot influence the level of taxation, (3-5) there exists no governmental
support; opportunity to receive credits or external financing.
My mission was to accumulate debts
My mission was to accumulate debts of the factory. Debts to the state
budget, debts to the employees. Of course in reasonable amounts. In
amounts that would not cause strikes. It was very easy to do
Notes from the underground. A story of the representative of a leading
off-shore trader at one of Russian aluminium factories.
The Expert (Russian magazine), #3, 25 January 1999.
